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An important part of the literature on regulatory economics is based on the US experience, where a
well-established regulator faces a privately owned monopoly. It is sometimes forgotten that this model
does not apply in many places where a newly established regulator faces a government owned, or a
newly privatized, company. It definitely does not apply to the case of the Israeli communication industry
where the government serves as regulator and at the same time is the owner of the wireline monopolist.
The paper follows the regulatory experience of the Israeli communication industry over the last 20
years, analyzing its impact on consumers' welfare, the monopoly's profitability and its productivity.
Though the Israeli institutions may look to a Western observer today as unique they were quite common
in most of the developed economies prior to the wave of privatizations and deregulation in the 90s.
The lessons learned from the Israeli experience have, however, more than a historic interest, and may
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A. Introduction 
The  deregulation  and  liberalization  of  the  public  utility  industries  are  among  the  most 
dramatic institutional changes that have taken place in the Western economies in the last two 
decades. Industries that for decades had been regarded as prototypes of natural monopolies 
have  been  opened  to  competition,  and  the  role  of  the  regulator  was  downgraded  to  a 
secondary role. The reforms that started in the mid-80s with the deregulation of the U.S. 
transport industry (trucking, railroad, and airlines), spread across the Atlantic, and expanded 
to the telecommunication and electricity industries. Economists, who often spearheaded this 
move, called for the abolition of regulation whenever competition could be trusted. Building 
on their experience with the U.S. transport and telecommunication industries they blamed 
regulation  for  creating  incentives  for  misallocation  of  resources  (i.e.,  the  Averch-Johnson 
effect), leading to non-optimal quality, and weakening the incentives to increase efficiency. 
Regulators were depicted as prone to be captured by the regulated monopolies, and regulation 
was regarded as the biggest obstacle to the introduction of competition 
  The road to competition was not always smooth - the California electricity reforms 
and the British railroad privatization are often cited as examples of its pitfalls. Admittedly, 
economists often failed in predicting all the obstacles lying on the way. Still the prevailing 
mood in the economic literature concerning regulation was that of disapproval. Only few 
economists bothered to ask themselves the extent to which the US experience applicable also 
to other environments. After all, most of the US public utilities industries are unique in being 
controlled  since  their  establishment  by  private  interests,  whereas  the  ownership  of  their 
European counterparts was entrusted for many decades to the public sector. Similarly, most of 
the US regulating bodies are well entrenched institutions, dating back to the pre-WWII era, 
whereas in other parts of the world the regulating bodies have a much shorter history, and are, 
perhaps, less affected by the ‘signs of old age” which the US regulating bodies are accused of. 
This realization has led many economists to study the experience of regulating bodies outside 
the  US  so  as  to  provide  a  more  rounded  picture  of  the  strength  and  weaknesses  of  the 
regulatory process.  
The Israeli regulatory experience of the telecommunication industry may seem unique. For 
the last twenty years the regulatory process has been under government control, and up to ￿￿ 4
quite recently the major phone company was government owned and had full monopolistic 
power on the wireline market. Conventional wisdom would have regarded this combination as 
a sure prescription for inefficiency of various kinds. Still, at the beginning of the 21
st century 
the Israeli consumers enjoy a wide variety of advanced communication services at some of 
the lowest rates of the Western economies. This record is especially remarkable given the 
state  of  the  industry  twenty  years  ago  when  Bezeq,  the  Israeli  phone  operator,  was  first 
incorporated. The thriving state of the industry and the incumbent, on one hand, and the 
prevailing low phone rates, on the other, can be traced to the special mix of liberalization and 
regulation policies adopted by the government for the last two decades.  
This paper tells the story  of the Israeli industry, focusing on the interaction  between the 
regulated firm and its regulators.
1 The lessons to be derived from the Israeli experience have, 
definitely, a historic interest. After all, though the Israeli institutional environment may seem 
unique  on  the  background  of  the  institutional  setup  prevailing  in  the Western  economies 
today, it was quite common prior to the wave of privatizations and deregulation in the 90s. 
They seem, however, to be relevant for the regulatory process in general, and specifically for 
two  central  themes  in  the  new  economics  of  regulation  literature:  the  impact  of  the 
institutional environment on the regulatory outcomes, and the effect of the asymmetry in 
information on the regulatory regime.  
The paper opens with a description of the Israeli communication market, the institutional 
background and the changes in the size of the market and its composition. A discussion of the 
regulatory  regime  is  followed  by  three  sections  evaluating  its  impact  of  on  three  key 
parameters– consumers’ welfare, the monopoly’s profitability and production efficiency. The 
paper closes with lessons one can learn from the Israeli experience in light of the economic 
theory of regulation. 
 
B. The Israeli Communication Market. 
      1. Institutional Background 
Bezeq, the Israeli phone company, was established in 1984. The State of  Israel inherited in 
1948 the responsibilities for the provision of phone services from the British regime, and for 
the next 36 years it followed the UK model granting statutory monopoly to  the Post Office 
(later renamed the  Ministry  of  Communication). It was only in  the  early 80s that it was ￿￿ 5
recognized that the governmental structure lacks the flexibility required in order to provide a 
growing modern economy with adequate telecommunication services. Bezeq was established 
as a fully owned government-company, and when the government decided six years later to 
issue part of the stock on the Israeli stock-market it still preserved its status as majority stock 
holder. 
Bezeq was born into bad times. Since 1977 the Israeli economy had been inflicted by 
an uncontainable inflation, the CPI increasing between 50 and 370 percent annually. Bezeq 
was born in the final phases of that period, but it took the government another year (and 
another 300 percent inflation) before it mustered the courage to adopt severe anti-inflationary 
steps to halt  this ruinous  process. The years of fast inflation were characterized  by half-
hearted measures to slow down the price increase. Two of these policy measures affected the 
phone services directly: the price-freeze imposed on government services, and the cut  of 
government investment. Bezeq’s first task was to catch up with the ever-widening excess 
demand for phone lines, created by the cuts  in the Ministry of Communication’s investment 
budgets in previous years. 
Given the dire state of the communication market hardly anybody protested when 
Bezeq was granted a license that effectively transferred the monopoly rights enjoyed by the 
government to the new company
2, but as the waiting lines for phone services shrunk, more 
and more voices were heard calling for structural reform in the communication market. The 
new  mood  was  affected  by  a  deepening  awareness  that  the  monopolistic  structure  of the 
infrastructure industries constituted an impediment to growth, by an attempt to reduce the role 
of government in the economy, and by the wave of structural reforms that had swept these 
industries abroad 
Several  governmental  committees  in  the  late  ‘80s  recommended  replacing  the  all-
encompassing franchise of Bezeq by a series of permits regulating its activity in the separate 
telecommunication markets. It took, however, five years for these recommendations to be 
adopted. In 1994 the government revoked Bezeq’s general license, and the company received 
separate permits to operate in the domestic market (local and intercity calls), the international 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
1 Some aspects of the reform in the Israeli telecommunication market have been discussed by Gandel 
(1999)  and  Levi-Faur  (1999).  The  reforms  and  the  regulatory  regime  in  the  Israeli  public  utility 
industries are discussed in an early paper of mine (Gronau, 2002). 
2￿The broad definitions used in the license to describe Bezeq's monopolistic rights can be attributed to 
the  fact  that  the  license  was  formulated  by  members  of  the  Ministry  of  Communication  legal 
department who were assigned to move to the new company. ￿￿ 6
calls market, the mobile phone markets, and equipment sales and installations. To prevent 
cross-subsidization between these services and assure any potential competitor open access to 
Bezeq lines , the permits for operating in the mobile, international and equipment market were 
granted  to  Bezeq  subsidiaries,  establishing  a  structural  separation  between  the  monopoly 
operating in the domestic market and its subsidiaries’ operation in the other markets. 
The first market opened to competition was the cellular phone market. The activity in 
this  market  was  monopolized  by  a  Bezeq’s  subsidiary,  Pelephone,  and  the  government 
preferred to open the market in a controlled fashion, where for the first years it would be 
operated by a duopoly.
3  
Of critical importance to the future development of this market was the procedure 
adopted to select the new competitor. The competitor was chosen in an open bid, where the 
main criterion was the rate structure. The winner of the bid, the Cellcom company, offered an 
unprecedented  rate  in  the  Western  mobile  phone  market  at  the  time  -  2.5  US  cents  per 
minute
4. The duopoly period lasted for about 3 years. These were years of unprecedented 
growth of the mobile phone market. In the July 1997 the government declared another bid for 
the  selection  of  a  third  competitor.  Realizing  the  growth  potential  of  the  market,  the 
government changed the main criterion for the selection of the winner, offering the “prize” to 
the highest bidder for the permit. The winner, the Partner company got the permit for the price 
of  400  million  US  dollars
5.  The  technology  adopted  by  the  new  entrant  (GSM)  and  an 
aggressive marketing strategy allowed it to compete successfully with its entrenched rivals.
 6 
        Though the opening of the mobile phone market had definitely the most far-reaching 
implications  for  the  communication  market,  and  was  most  probably  the  most  dramatic 
structural reform in the Israeli public utilities sector, it had little political repercussions
7. This 
was not the case when in October 1995 the government published its auction for two new 
                                                            
3The length of the duopoly period was defined as 5 years, or the period required for the market to 
expand to 200 thousand subscribers, whichever came first. 
4￿Cellcom was a joint venture of a leading international phone company (Bell South), an international 
banking group (the Safra group) and a leading domestic investment company. The financial backing, 
the professional know-how and the barriers on entry imposed by the government (even if only for a 
limited period) clearly contributed the low price offred in the bid. 
5￿Partner is a subsidiary of the Hutchinson group 
6 The technology was dictated by the terms of the bid. 
7 In 1993 mobile phones contributed only 3 percent of Bezeq’s income and consequently the move 
encountered only mild opposition from Bezeq's management and workers' union.￿￿￿ 7
operators  in the international calls market, which were  to share the market  with Bezeq’s 
subsidiary - “Bezeq International”.  
The international calls market served for years as a main source of income used to 
subsidize local access. Setting a high rate for outgoing calls allowed Bezeq to charge high 
rates for its interconnect services for the incoming international calls. Since the rate for an 
outgoing  call from  Israel  was  substantially  higher  than  that  prevailing  abroad, the  Israeli 
international  calls  market  was  characterized  by  an  imbalance  of  traffic,  the  number  of 
incoming calls exceeding significantly that of outgoing calls. Thus, the revenues from the 
interconnect charges for incoming international calls had become one of the main sources of 
finance  of  Bezeq’s  domestic  activities.  The  regulator,  though  aware  of  the  allocative 
inefficiency, did little to change this system of cross-subsidies from the foreign customer to 
the Israeli one. 
Given the high share of Bezeq’s income originating in international calls (in 1995 it 
constituted a third of Bezeq’s income), the opening of the market to competition did not go 
unopposed. Bezeq’s management, and in particular its workers’ union, threatened to deny the 
new  entrants access  to  the  company’s  lines,  unless  Bezeq  is  compensated  for  its  loss  of 
income. The government succumbed to this pressure and set up a scheme that would prevent a 
sharp decline in the company’s profitability.
8  
The winners in the international providers’ bid were chosen again on the basis of the 
lowest rates. The two companies that won the bid offered to lower the rates of outgoing calls, 
on average, by 70 percent. The incumbent was prevented by the regulator from matching 
these prices. The new entrants started their operation in July 1997 and within 2 months the 
incumbent lost more than 40 percent of the market. At this point the restrictions on minimum 
rates were removed, and the incumbent was allowed to compete freely. Within few years the 
share of the competitors stabilized, each company serving about one-third of the market. 
The  original  government  plan  called  for  the  opening  of  the  domestic  market  to 
competition by 1999. A series of government committees were unanimous in recommending 
facility-based competition as the base of the reform, rejecting “unbundling” as a too time 
consuming  process. To prevent cherry-picking, new competitors focusing on the business 
                                                            
8￿The scheme consisted of three parts: 1) a levy was imposed on the international providers; 2) the 
government reduced the special tax imposed on phone services, and 3) the government decelerated the 
rate of decline of domestic phone rates.  
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sector, new entrants were obligated to provide virtually universal service throughout most of 
the country.
 9 
The only operators who could meet these harsh entry requirements were the TV cable 
companies whose network was spread all over the country, and who enjoyed, at the time, 
remarkable  profitability.  But  the  scheme  never  materialized.  A  disagreement  between  the 
Ministries of Finance, Justice and Communication on whether the cable companies should be 
charged for the special permit to engage in two-way phone service resulted in a delay of the 
cable companies' entry.  By the time the controversy was settled, the opportunity for opening 
the market to competition was gone. The rich resources commanded by the cable companies 
were  squandered  on  buyouts  of  their  competitors  at  inflated  prices,  and  communication 
companies lost their popularity in the capital market. 
10 
Only after a new government committee recommended in 2002 to alleviate many of 
the  previous  entry  barriers,  allowing  operators  providing  a  limited  array  of  services  in  a 
limited number of districts to obtain operator permits, did the merged cable company enter the 
domestic phone market.  
The declining popularity of communication companies in the capital market hindered 
not only the liberalization of the domestic fixed line market, but also the privatization of 
Bezeq. It took the government several years before it was able to sell its controlling interests 
in the company to a group of private investors. In May 2005 the company was finally sold in 
an open bid, its price set at 3.1 billion US dollars. 
 
2. The Development of the Communication Market      
When Bezeq was established in 1984 the number of direct lines was 1.04 million. At the time 
220 thousand waited to be connected to the network. Within six years the company succeeded 
in cutting the number of waiting customers to 20 thousand, increasing the number of lines to 
1.63 million. The penetration rate increased from 80 to 83 percent of residential households. 
The fast growth continued at the same rate throughout the first half of the 90s (Table 1). The 
                                                            
9￿Many of the large business companies handled their internal communication (for example the 
communication between the bank headquarters and the branches) through lines rented from Bezeq. 
This type of business did not contribute, however, to competition. 
10￿Bezeq contributed to this result. At the urging of the government it entered the multi-channel TV 
market offering satellite services. The cut-throat competition that followed the entry of the satellite 
company accelerated the depletion of the cable companies’ resources, leading one of them to the brink 
of bankruptcy. 
 ￿￿ 9
fast growth  of the economy accompanying  the mass immigration from the former Soviet 
Union, led to an expansion  of  the  network  at a  rate exceeding  7  percent annually.    The 
expansion in the network led, in turn, to an annual increase of traffic of over 10 percent. 
  The fast growth lasted for dozen years, and came to a stop only in 1996. The slowdown 
(Table 2) can be again be traced to macro factors - the slowdown of the economy (and, in 
particular, an unprecedented recession in the construction industry), but it is partly explained 
by the fast increasing popularity of the mobile phone. The rate of growth of fixed lines slowed 
down to an annual rate of 3 percent, and though the growth of traffic kept up at the previous 
pace (i.e., at an annual rate of 9.4 percent), it underwent a drastic change in composition. 
Land to Land (LTL) traffic (in terms of minutes) shrunk at a rate of 2.5 percent, and the whole 
growth is explained by the growth of internet traffic and calls originating or terminating in the 
mobile and international networks.  
  The  changes  in  the  composition  of  Bezeq’s  traffic  reflect  the  dramatic  impact  the 
structural changes had on the shape of the market following the opening of the mobile phone 
market to competition. The aggressive pricing policy adopted by Cellcom changed completely 
the image of the mobile service and with it the size of the potential market. Motorola, which 
started the service in 1987, aimed its services at a select fraction of the business community. 
The high rates charged for the service made it a luxury, catering to the rich. In 1993, at the 
eve of Cellcom’s entry into the market, the number of Pelephone subscribers did not exceed 
100 thousand - less than 5 percent of the fixed lines operated by Bezeq. Within three years, 
the number of subscribers increased ten-fold.
11 The entry of Partner inaugurated a new wave 
of  expansion.  In  the  years  1996-2001  the  number  of  subscribers  to  the  mobile  network 
increased at an annual rate of 36.5 percent, a rate unprecedented in the history of the durable-
goods markets in Israel (table 3). By the end of 1999 the number of subscribers to the mobile 
phone network equaled that of the fixed-line, and by 2002 it surpassed it by more than one- 
half. 
  The fast growth in the number of subscribers is reflected in the composition of traffic. 
In 1996 nine out of ten calls (in terms of minutes) originated in a fixed-line phone. By 2001 
                                                            
11￿Pelephone tried to emanate the image of a leader in terms of service quality, but had to bow to the 
price pressure and lower its prices by one third. A series of technical difficulties left its marketing 
policy in shambles, and it lost its dominating position to Cellcom, and few years later found itself 
trailing even behind the newcomer, Partner. 
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this number dropped to two-thirds. Mobile to mobile (MTM) calls which in 1996 constituted 
a miniscule share of the market (3 percent), contributed one quarter of the traffic by 2001. 
  Declining prices resulted in a faster growth of the international calls market relative to 
the  domestic  market  even  prior  to  its  opening  to  competition  (the  international  market 
growing at an annual rate of 14 percent). The entry of the new companies accelerated this 
process, but its major impact was on the direction of traffic. The sharp cut of the rates of 
outgoing  calls  led  to  a  traffic  reversal  (Figure  1).  Whereas  prior  to  1997  outgoing  calls 
constituted less than 40 percent of international traffic, they captured 60 percent of the market 
once it opened to competition. 
 
C. The Regulatory Regime 1990- - - -2002. 
The  tariff  regime  in  the  communication  market  in  the  late  80s  suffered  from  all  the 
shortcomings  afflicting the other  Israeli public utility industries: a tariff  system based  on 
perfect  pass-through  (‘cost-plus’),  an  arbitrary  rate  structure  and  multi-body  regulators. 
Efficiency  ranked  relatively  low  in  the  government’s  list  of  priorities,  and  this  attitude 
changed only little when the government changed its role from direct provider to the owner of 
the  phone  company.  The  government  also  preserved  its  hold  of  the  regulatory  system: 
everyday regulation of the new company was left with the Ministry of Communication, but 
any change in phone rates required the consent of both the Minister of Communication and 
the  Minister  of  Finance,  as  well  as  the  final  approval  of  the  Finance  Committee  of  the 
parliament. 
  The rate structure reflected the distributional priorities of the owners and the regulators. 
As  in  other  places,  the  residential  sector  was  given  preference  over  the  business  sector. 
Access was subsidized by traffic- the fixed monthly user-fee being set at a level substantially 
lower than the costs associated with the local loop. The profit margins from traffic increased 
with distance: international calls were the most profitable, followed by inter-city and local 
calls. The involvement of the Parliamentary Finance Committee in the regulatory process 
assured that distributional considerations would continue to play an important role in price 
setting also after Bezeq became a business oriented firm. 
  Bezeq did not have enough time to recover from the impact of the hyper-inflation when 
it was hit by the fallout of the program to halt inflation. The 1985 program called for a price 
freeze of government services, and Bezeq saw for the next three years its meager profits ￿￿ 11
eroding. The erosion of profits brought Bezeq to the doors of the regulator in request of a re-
evaluation of the tariff regime to restore its profitability.    
  The  recommendations  to  open  the  communication  market  to  competition  were 
accompanied by a recommendation to establish an independent professional regulating body 
(similar to OFTEL). This recommendation was never approved. Thus, when Bezeq asked for 
a tariff reevaluation the government settled for an alternative scheme. The role of periodic 
tariff reevaluation was delegated to an ad-hoc public committee consisting of representatives 
of  the  regulating  ministries,  independent  experts  and  public  representatives.  This  scheme 
became  the  mode  of  operation  for  the  following  fifteen  years.  The  1988  committee  was 
followed by three additional ones: in 1993, 1997 and 2002. The committees had an advisory 
status (their recommendations had to be approved by the Ministers and the parliamentary 
committee), but with the years they gained ever increasing independence.
12  
  The first committee was asked to set the level of tariffs, determine the length of the 
tariff review period, establish the formula for rate adjustments during the review period, and 
eliminate cross- subsidies. The terms of reference of the 1997 and 2002 committees were 
expanded,  following  the  liberalization  of  the  mobile  and  international  calls  markets,  to 
incorporate also the setting of interconnect tariffs. 
  Following the British example, the first public committee recommended that the “Pass-
through” rate-setting procedure be replaced by “Price-cap.” The shift, however, turned out to 
be gradual, and the method employed continued to be a mixture of Price-cap and of the Rate 
of Return (ROR) methods. Following the Price-cap prescription, the regulatory review period 
was  set  at  4-5  years,  and  the  rate  adjustment  followed  the  RPI-X.  formula.  The  Israeli 
scheme deviated, however, from the OFTEL model in two important aspects: the mechanism 
of setting the average rate and the flexibility in setting the individual rates. Whereas the Oftel 
was  committed  to  a  gradual  change  in  the  average  phone  rates  through  changes  in  the 
adjustment factor  X  (Spiller and  Vogelsang,  1996),  the  Israeli  ad-hoc  review  committees 
                                                            
12The increased independence is reflected in the committees' composition. The first committee was 
headed by a representative of one of the regulating bodies (the director general of the Ministry of 
Finance) and a representative of Bezeq served as a voting member. The next committee was headed 
already  by  a  public  representative,  and  Bezeq’s  representative  was  relegated  to  the  status  of  an 
“observer”.  In  the  following  committees  the  head  was  a  public  representative,  and  Bezeq’s 
representatives appeared before the committee as witnesses only. The smaller representation of the 
regulating  and  regulated  bodies  contributed  to  the  committees’  image  of  impartiality  and  to  the 
public's (and Government's) acceptance of their recommendations. 
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employed a two-stage mechanism: a discrete change at the beginning of each review period, 
and a gradual change throughout the period (X).
13 Furthermore, in contrast to the British 
system, the regulated company was not allowed any flexibility in the setting of individual 
rates.  
The discrete change in the average rate required a detailed calculation of the monopoly's 
"excess profits" and "inefficiency" at the end of each review period. These, in turn, called for 
a periodic readjustment of the rate of return given the dynamic changes in the competitive 
structure of the industry. Disbarring the firm from setting the individual rates meant that they 
had to be set by the committee itself.  
          Table 4 summarizes the main parameters of the ad-hoc committees' recommendations. 
The  changes  in  these  parameters  reflect  the  changes  in  the  economic-technological 
environment  in  which  the  regulated  company  operated  as  well  as  changes  affecting  the 
regulator: the dynamic process of accumulation of information, and the changing political 
constraints faced by the committees
14.  
          The first committee's recommendations for the initial rates level reflect its limited base 
of information and its attempt to gain Bezeq’s approval for the new rate setting procedure. 
The committee adopted Bezeq’s 1998 cost accounts as the base for its tariff, foregoing any 
adjustments. Bezeq’s depreciated assets were used as the base for the calculation of capital 
costs, and no attempt was made to distinguish between assets regarded as “used and useful”, 
and those which do not contribute to production. When the next committee had to decide on 
the initial rate level for the second review period (1994-1998) it set the normative costs (i.e. 
the  “allowed”  costs)  employing  its  predecessor’s  adjustment  formula.  It  distinguished 
between expenditures that the company can control in the short run (e.g., wage and salary, 
and other operating costs) and expenditures which the company can affect only in the long 
run (e.g., the costs of debt and the interconnect charges for international outgoing calls), and 
applied the adjustment formula to the “controllable” part, accepting the other part as given. 
The following committees abandoned this distinction, adopting the trajectory of normative 
costs set by their predecessors. 
    To  set  the  trajectory  of  normative  costs  one  has  to  know  potential  for  increased 
productivity. The first committee was aware of Bezeq’s gross inefficiency, but again the lack 
of accurate information led it to adopt a conservative estimate. The low rates of adjustment 
                                                            
13￿A similar method as been adopted by the UK electricity regulator (OFFER) in 1994, and was later 
used by other regulators in the UK and elsewhere.￿￿￿ 13
during the first review period 1990-1993 (X = 3% for the first two years and 3.5% thereafter) 
were, at least partially, intended to make the new regulatory regime more acceptable to the 
monopoly and its workers. These considerations did not affect the second committee when it 
raised the adjustment rate to X = 6.5%, a rate that, with the exception of OFTEL, was higher 
than any of the rates adopted by European regulators at the time
15. The third committee had 
access  to  much  more  detailed  information  than  its  predecessors.  Bezeq’s  costing  system 
showed a sharp decline in its equipment prices. The committee estimated that the rate of 
decline  was  10-12  percent  annually.  The fast  decline  is  explained  both  by  technological 
improvements  in  the  switching  equipment  and  the  fiber-optic  network,  and  by  increased 
competition among suppliers. The committee recommended that the adjustment rate for the 
third  review  period  be set at  X  =  7%.  Finally,  the  fourth  committee  being  aware  of  the 
slowdown in Bezeq's growth and its continuous effort to cut costs settled for an adjustment 
rate of X = 3.5%, with an in-built mechanism that corrects this factor according to output 
growth. 
When the Price-cap procedure was first proposed there were hopes that it would relieve the 
regulator from the problematic calculation of the normative rate of return. Given the fast 
changes in Bezeq's competitive environment, these hopes proved unrealistic in the Israeli 
context.  The  calculation  of  this  rate  reflects  also  the  committees'  increased  access  to 
information.  The  first  committee  set  the  normative  rate  of  return  was  at  8.5%.  Since  the 
committee  could  not  reach  agreement  about  the  adequate  rate  it  was  set  by  Minister  of 
Communication. The second committee preserved this rate, but the third committee, noting the 
fast growth in mobile traffic and expecting the fixed line service to open to competition soon, 
raised the to 10.5 percent. Neither of these committees based its evaluation on a detailed 
study. When the fourth committee (2002) decided to readdress the issue it used for the first 
time a CAPM model based on 12 years of Bezeq’s experience in the Israeli stock market, 
leading it to conclude that, given a normative equity-debt ratio of 40:60, the proper (before-
tax) rate of return should be 13 percent, and the average price of capital (WACC) - 8.5 percent 
(the after-tax WACC being 5.43 percent).
 16 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
14￿This section is written on the basis of the reports prepared by the four committees. 
15￿This rate exceeded by far any rate applied to the tariffs of other public utilities in Israel, and was 
partly intended to erode Bezeq's excess profitability. 
16 The committee estimated the value of b to be in the range of 0.45-0.54, and the leveraged b to be 
0.7-0.83. Bezeq’s value of b for the years preceding 2000 was found to be equal to 0.7, but following 
the disenchantment of the capital market from the performance of the telecommunication companies ￿￿ 14
     The changes in the trajectory of the normative costs and the changes in Bezeq's growth of 
output and profitability are reflected in the different rates of tariff change (the Po adjustment) 
at the beginning of each review period. Whereas the first committee recommended a price 
hike of 15 percent, the second committee recommended an average rate cut of 10 percent, the 
third – a cut of 10.5 percent and the fourth- a cut of 5.5 percent. It is noteworthy that the 
second committee's calculations showed that the rate should have been reduced by 16 percent, 
but it hesitated to recommend such a large cut, in apprehension that it would be unacceptable 
to the politicians.   
  One of the main challenges facing the committees was the construction of a cost-based 
tariff system. In the absence of a reliable costing system there was little the first committee 
could do about it
17. It took a while before an adequate costing system was established at the 
initiation of the Ministry of Communication, which appointed a committee of experts to carry 
out this task. 
 The committee estimated that if monthly fees were to cover the direct access costs, they 
would have to be raised by a factor of 6, which would allow a reduction of 33-40 percent in 
call  rates.  The  second  review  committee  (1993),  being  aware  of  the  parliament  Finance 
Committee's sensitivity to the distributional impact of such an extreme change, adopted a 
gradual approach recommending that every reduction in the call rates would be accompanied 
by an identical increase in the user fee. 
  The committee recommended that the rates of outgoing international calls be reduced 
at a rate faster than domestic calls
18. Bezeq, in an attempt to reduce the attractiveness of entry 
into the international market, hastened to oblige, reducing the rates even faster than suggested 
by the committee, and slowing the reduction in domestic rates.  
The new costing system, and its updates by Bezeq, allowed the third committee (1997), for 
the  first  time,  to  completely  overhaul  the  rate  structure.    It  computed  the  “Long  Run 
Incremental Costs” (LRIC) as the sum of the average capital costs (at replacement value) and 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
(including cable TV) it  jumped  to 1.7￿The jump reflects not merely a change of mood but was caused 
to a large extent by the heavy losses of Bezeq's subsidiaries (the mobile company,  the international 
provider, and, first and foremost, the satellite TV company) The committee had, therefore, to estimate 
what would have been Bezeq’s value of b if it had confined itself to domestic service only. 
17￿The committee conjectured that the international and long-distance intercity calls subsidize the local 
and  regional  calls.  Its  report  does  not  even  mention  access  as  the  service  that  is  most  heavily 
subsidized.   
18￿ The  committee  recommended  that  the  special  tax  imposed  on  phone  calls  be  reduced  to  that 
purpose. ￿￿ 15
the average direct operating costs. Since the “LRIC” of all services summed up only to two-
thirds  of  the  normative  (i.e.,  the  “allowed”)  costs
19  the  committee  had  to  decide  how  to 
allocate the overheads. It rejected the Ramsey pricing principle in favor of a proportionate 
markup, imposing on all services, with the exception of telephony, a markup of 50%. Ramsey 
pricing would have created a special problem in the case of telephony, since it meant higher 
markups on access than on traffic, something that would have been completely unacceptable 
to the parliamentary committee
20. Consequently, the committee recommended only a modest 
increase in the monthly fee (12 percent) to cover the access LRIC, and all the phone service 
overheads were charged to traffic, resulting in call rate that were 3.3 times their  LRIC
21. 
  The high markup on domestic calls raised the problem of the appropriate markup on 
interconnect calls. The Ministry of Communication rules established that the interconnect 
rates paid by the mobile phone and the international calls companies should be negotiated 
directly between the involved parties, but given the frequent failure of these negotiations the 
rates were often set by the Ministry itself. This process resulted in a myriad of rates, the rate 
paid by each operator depending on his bargaining power or the pressure he could exert on the 
Minister. The committee set for the first time a uniform rate for all operators, a rate based on 
Bezeq's domestic rates.
22 Given the 220 percent markup on domestic calls the committee 
found ECPR pricing to be unacceptable. Arguing  that the terminating call in Bezeq’s lines 
use only one section of the local loop (rather than two) it was concluded that interconnect 
calls  should carry only half the markup (i.e., 110 percent). The lower markup translated into a 
reduction  of  interconnect  rates  of  60  percent,  the  new  rates  complying  with  the 
recommendations of the OECD. 
                                                            
19 The difference is explained by common costs (given the small fraction of operating costs that can be 
assigned  to  specific  outputs)  and  the  difference  between  the  assets’  replacement  values  and  their 
historical costs.  
20 Applying a 50 percent markup to access direct costs would have meant a jump in user fees of two-
thirds.  
21 The direct costs of access were estimated to be more than 3 times those of traffic. The "share" of 
access in common costs was, therefore more than 1.5 times the direct costs of traffic. This ratio leads 
to the "astronomous" markup on traffic. However, in spite of the high markup, traffic rates were cut 
sharply. Given the average rate cut of 10.5% and the increase in the monthly user fees, the tariffs of 
domestic calls were reduced by one- third. 
￿
22 The rate varied with the hours of the day (peak and off-peak hours) and whether the operator used a 
local or an inter-city connection. ￿￿ 16
  Bezeq's original rate structure distinguished between three time slots (peak, interim 
and off-peak hours), and three distance ranges (local, regional and intercity). The committee 
recommended that this system be simplified but left the details to Bezeq's initiative.  Goaded 
by the rate structure of the mobile operators, Bezeq adopted a uniform rate for the whole 
country, a rate that varied only between peak and off-peak hours. At the same time it moved 
to have its tariffs based on continuous measurement instead of discrete units.
23  
  Given  the  major  overhaul  of  Bezeq's  tariff  structure  the  fourth  committee  (2002) 
introduced only minor changes. It raised the user’s fee by 15 percent, pursuing the previous 
committee’s  policy  of  rebalancing;  it  abolished  the  minimum  charge  to  increase 
transparency
24, and given the increased traffic in off-peak hours it reduced the difference in 
rates between peak and off-peak calls
25. Both the rebalancing between access and traffic and 
between  off-peak  and  peak  contributed  to  the  reduction  in  cross-subsidies  between  the 
business and the residential sector. 
An outsider may blame the committees for excessive cautiousness. These accusations are not 
completely unfounded. The committees were aware of their advisory status, and that their 
recommendations required the approval of the Ministers and the parliamentary committee. 
Consequently, they may have shunned away from recommendations that they feared might 
look extreme, in order to preserve their own credibility. To what extent were these worries 
justified? Examining the recommendations' acceptance rates reveals an interesting pattern. 
The political level always adopted the recommendations concerning the rate cuts at the entry 
to a new review period. However, in response to Bezeq's warnings that future rate cuts would 
undermine  the  company's  financial  stability,  the  political  level  consistently  reduced  the 
adjustment  rate  (X).
26    Surprisingly,  the  ostensibly  most  controversial  recommendations- 
                                                            
23 According to the old system the calls were measured in terms of “units.” The price of a unit was 
fixed, and its length (in terms of seconds) varied between peak and off-peak hours and between local 
and inter-city calls.  
￿
24 The minimum charge was a remnant of the "unit" charging system (see fn.16). It was equivalent to 
the rate for a 1.6 minute call during peak hours, and a 9-minute call during off-peak. As a result the 
marginal tariff during the off-peak hours applied only to one-eighth of the traffic. 
25 The rate for peak hours was cut by 25 percent and for off peak only by 8 percent. 
26￿When the second committee recommended an adjustment rate of 6.5% the Ministers approved only 
6%, which was reduced, when the international market was opened to competition,  to 3.5%; the third 
committee recommended an adjustment rate of 7%, but the Ministers approved only 6%, which was 
reduced later  to 3.5%, when Bezeq claimed that its output did not keep up with the committee's 
forecasts; the fourth committee was much more conservative with its adjustment rate (3.5%), but still 
it was cut to 2.5%. ￿￿ 17
those  concerning  rebalancing,  had  a  perfect  acceptance  record.  The  weak  opposition  the 
recommendation to raise user fees met in parliament can be attributed to the gradual process, 
the  modest  increases  in  the  user  fees  each  time,  and  the  fact  that  it  was  accompanied 




D. The Change in Tariffs 1990- - - -2002. 
Describing  the  challenge  they  tried  to  meet,  all  tariff  review  committees  used  a  similar 
language,  -  “The  balancing  of  consumers’  welfare  and  the  preservation  of  Bezeq’s 
profitability.” Did the committees attain their goals? To measure the committees' success one 
has to examine the change in the phone rates and the effect they had on Bezeq’s profitability. 
  Throughout the period real phone rates declined by 4 percent annually, summing to a 
70 percent decline over the period (Table 5)
28. The persistent decline of the phone rates could 
have served as conclusive evidence of the regulator's success, if it had not been for the fact 
that the rate of price change in the regulatory era (1990-2003) does not differ from that of the 
pre-regulatory era. The comparison between the periods is, however, misleading. Whereas the 
rate reduction since 1990 is the result of an active policy applied in a period of low inflation, 
the price erosion in the previous period was the result of a passive process generated by an 
erratic macro policy adopted to combat an out-of-control inflation. 
  Table  5  documents  this  difference.  The  period  is  divided  into  4  parts:  The  low 
inflation period (1973-1997), the hyperinflation (1977-1985), the first stages of disinflation 
(1985-1991), and the regulatory period (1991-2003).
29 The table presents the average annual 
inflation rate, and the average and the dispersion of the real phone rate changes. It is the 
standard deviation of the real rate annual changes, much more than the mean, that tells the 
story of the regulator’s price policy.  
     The steady erosion of the real rates in the first period, accompanied by an increase in the 
dispersion  of  the  year-to-  year  changes  reflect  the  government's  attempt  to  slow  down 
                                                            
27 To deflect part of the opposition it was ruled that phone lines that are sparsely used are entitled to a 
discount in the user fees. 
28￿The price changes reported in table 5 are the prices of phone services used in the calculation of the 
Israeli CPI deflated by the change in the average CPI. Since 1997 this index includes also the price 
of cellular phone prices. 
￿
29 Since the 1990 rate hike by the first overview committee should be considered as a correction of the 
price erosion in the previous five years, the year 1990 was included in the third period. ￿￿ 18
inflation by slowing down the adjustment of the prices of government services. The ever 
increasing deficits made the government realize that this policy was unsustainable. The rate 
adjustments were speeded up but could not catch up with an inflation process that broke out 
of control. The result was a slowing down of the real rate erosion and an increase in the 
dispersion of annual price changes. The nominal price freeze imposed on Bezeq in the first 
years of its existence continued the real rate erosion, but the erosion was corrected by the rate 
hike recommended by the first review committee. The regulatory regime ushered in a new era 
characterized by a steady reduction in nominal (and real) rates with only slight changes from 
years to year. 
A similar story is told by the last column of table 5, which reports the number of annual rate 
adjustments. In the first period the government stuck to its policy of semi-annual adjustments, 
even at the cost of rate erosion. The acceleration of inflation forced the government to forsake 
this policy, and adjust the rates almost monthly. Only when inflation slowed down could the 
government resume its semi-annual rate adjustment policy, which was replaced in 1992 by 
one adjustment per year. The suppression of inflation and the new regulatory regime reduced 
the unintended part of the real rate decline to a minimum.  
  Since 1997 the CPI “phone service prices” includes also the price of cellular phone 
prices. To what extent can the decline in “phone service prices” be explained by the decline in 
the mobile phone rates? The period 1997-2002 is generally regarded as a period of intense 
competition in the mobile phone services, with the newcomer “Partner” trying to widen its 
foothold  in  the  market.  It  could  be  expected  that  the  aggressive  competition  would  be 
reflected in a price decline. The CPI mobile price series (Figure 2) comes, therefore, as a 
surprise. Not only that mobile phone prices did not decline - they rose over the period in real 
terms by 10 percent (by 40 percent in nominal terms). 
  There is no argument that the opening of the market to competition, and the entry of 
Cellcom changed the shape of this market. The decision to make the price of service the 
decisive criteria in the selection of the first entrant had a revolutionary effect on mobile phone 
rates. It looks, however, as if the sharp rate decline was a distinct event. After 3 years of 
competition, prices started to edge upward, competition changing its nature from price to 
quality-of-service competition.
30 
                                                            
30  There  is  also  the  possibility  that  “discount  packages”,  so  popular  in  the  mobile  companies’ 
marketing strategy, are not reflected in the official CPI. ￿￿ 19
  Is the pattern of change of the mobile phone prices unique to that market or is it 
characteristic of other competitive markets?  To answer this question we examined the price 
behavior of international calls. Figure 3 describes the change of the international call rates 
since 1990. For the first two years nominal rates did not catch up with the average price 
increase. In May 1992 rates shot up by more than 60 percent and hardly changed till January 
1994
31.  At that  time  Bezeq,  expecting  the  liberalization  of  the  international  calls  market, 
lowered the nominal international rates by 30 percent, and froze them voluntarily for the next 
three years (resulting in their erosion in real terms by another 30 percent)
32. At the eve of 
liberalization real rates were, therefore, one half of what they had been four years earlier.  The 
entry of the new rivals forced the incumbent to cut his prices by 70 percent, but this was to be 
the last rate reduction. Since July 1997 international rates have crept upward at a cumulative 
rate of 75 percent (50 percent in real terms), following the pattern observed earlier in the case 
of mobile phone services. 
       Throughout the period both the international providers and the mobile operators enjoyed 
a sharp decline in the price of their equipment and an excess capacity of international lines. 
Their customers did not, however, share in this decline of input price. If in the case of the 
mobile market one can explain price increases as a result of an increase in the quality and 
diversity of service, this explanation does not apply in the case of international providers. 
 
  Not less important than the average decline in phone rates, was the attempt to base the 
individual rates on costs. The manifestation of this move was a considerable simplification of 
the rate structure, and the rebalancing of access and traffic tariffs. The monthly user fee in 
1989 was equivalent to the cost of 24 minutes of an intercity call at peak hours. In 2003 this 
ratio rose to 400. Since 1993, when the process of rebalancing started, user-fees increased (in 
real terms) 2.5 times, while the average price of a phone call was cut by one-half. The income 
from user fees increased, as a result, in the period 1988-2002 from one-quarter to one-third of 
Bezeq’s phone revenue. This achievement is especially laudable given the traditional bias of 
the Parliamentary Finance Committee in favor of the residential sector. 
                                                            
31 There is no explanation for the sudden jump in rates in 1992, in particular given the first review 
committee’s recommendation to lower the rates of international calls at a faster rate than the rest of 
services. 
32 In January 1994 Bezeq, as part of its obligation to lower the average phone rates at the point of entry 
into the second review period by 10 percent, proposed to lower the international rates by 30 percent 
and lower the domestic rates by less than 10 percent. ￿￿ 20
  To  gain  a  better  appreciation  of  the  Israeli  regulator’  achievements  it  is  worth 
comparing the Israeli phone rates with those abroad. Figure 4 describes the users’ fees and the 
average price of a domestic call in Israel and seven West European countries in 1990 and 
2000. At  the  start of the new Israeli regulatory regime  Israeli call  rates  were among the 
highest in Europe. The price of an average (one minute) call was equal to that in England, and 
lower only than the prices prevailing in Ireland and Germany. By the end of the decade it was 
among the lowest (equal to that in Sweden and higher than that in the Netherlands). The 
lowering of the rates would not have been possible except for the sharp increase in the user 
fees. Though the Israeli fees are still the lowest in the sample, the difference between the 
Israeli rate and those of the other countries has shrunk considerably. The Israeli regulator was 
able to balance the rate to an extent unmatched in the sample, while making Israel at the same 
time the cheapest country in terms of overall phone rates. 
   
  Bezeq’s revenue from domestic services in 2002 was 1.18 billion US dollars. If it had 
not been for the tariff decline, prices would have been higher by 70 percent.  An upward 
estimate of the contribution of the regulatory regime is obtained if one assumes that traffic is 
insensitive  to  price.  By  this  estimate,  the  rate  reduction  saved  in  2002  the  Israeli  phone 
customers 0.8 billion dollars. Allowing for a price elasticity of one-half, the estimate of the 
gains in consumer surplus declines by about one-ninth.
33  
 
      E. The Profitability of Bezeq 
It was shown in the previous section that the rate of decline in Bezeq’s tariffs did not differ 
between the pre-regulatory and the regulatory eras. But whereas in the first period it was the 
                                                            
33 Let the arc-elasticity of demand be h. Let the ratio of the price in the absence of regulation (P1)￿to 
the regulated  price (P0  ￿be  denoted by ￿ a    [  a =  P1/P0 ], the  ratio of quantities  be denoted by ￿                 
[￿ = X1/X0], and let R0 denote the consumers’ expenditures following regulation R=P0X0 . The arc- 
elasticity of demand is defined 














x     .                  
    Hence                       ￿ = [(1+a)+(1-a)h] /[(1+a)-(1-a)h]   .                             ￿
The addition to consumer surplus due to regulation is   CS= (1/2) (1+ ￿) (a-1) R0. Inserting ￿ in this 
equation yields                CS  = R0* [(a+1)( a-1)]/[( a+1)+( a-1) h]. 
The calculation includes both the residential and the business sector, assuming the savings of the latter 
are transferred to the consumers or increase profits.￿￿￿ 21
accidental outcome of a process that went out of control, in the second period it was the 
deliberate result of a process initiated by the regulators. Nowhere is this difference more 
noticeable than when one examines Bezeq’s profitability. 
  In  the  years  1973-1984  Bezeq  was  operated  as  part  of  the  Ministry  of 
Communication.  Since  the  government  accounting  system  does  not  report  profits,  the 
examination  has  to  be  confined  to  the  period  since  the  establishment  of  Bezeq  in  1984. 
Throughout the discussion we will distinguish between the period prior to 1997, a period 
where international calls were still an integral part of Bezeq’s operation, and the period since 
1997, when the company’s activity was confined to the domestic market. To distinguish the 
range of operation of the company between the two periods we will refer to the company in 
the second period as Bezeq domestic-operator (D-O).
34 
The  profit  and  loss  report  of  1984/85  still  bears  the  signs  of  the  destruction  the 
hyperinflation inflicted on Bezeq’s profitability. Net profit in that year (15 million dollars, in 
December 2002 prices) constituted a 1.5 percent return on the company’s net worth. Profits 
revived during the next two years (Figure 5B), but the slowdown of the economy and the 
price freeze led to a sharp reversal in the years 1988-1989. Given this low base, the rate hike 
initiated by the first committee tripled the profit.
35 
  The fast growth of the early 90s (and especially the growth of the more lucrative 
services, such as the international calls) led to a fast growth in the company’s profits, and by 
1993, at the end of the first review period, they were eight times their level in 1988. 
  The rate cut recommended by the second committee affected profits only for one year, 
and by 1995 profits bounced back to their original level. However, as Figure 5A indicates, 
profitability  depended  crucially  on  one  service  -  international  calls,  since  income  from 
domestic services did not cover the access deficit.  The reliance of profitability on this source 
of  income  made  the  liberalization  of  the  international  calls  market  such  an  excruciating 
experience. 
  Figure 6 shows the fast recovery of Bezeq’s profitability from this blow. Bezeq D-O  
which suffered from substantial losses in the period 1994-1996, was able already in 1997 to 
balance its books, and enjoyed booming profits from 1998 onward. The average rate of return 
                                                            
￿
34 The third committee reconstructed the account of Bezeq D-O for the period 1994-1996, so one can 
trace Bezeq's domestic market profits back to 1994.￿
￿
35 The recommendations were adopted only in July 1990, so their full effect on Bezeq’s profitability is 
only noticeable in 1991.￿￿￿ 22
from domestic operation in the third review period (1998-2002) was twice the normative rate 
of 10.5 percent recommended by the committee. The fast recovery is partly explained by the 
special  arrangements  made  by  the  regulator  on  the eve  of  the  opening  of  that  market  to 
competition
36, but is explained to a large extent by the increased productivity of the domestic 
operation. Ironically, Bezeq International, the Bezeq’s subsidiary that inherited the operation 
in  the  international  market,  was  unable  to  cope  with  the  new  competitive  environment.  
Within two years it slid into losses, which took three years to overcome. 
  Another  aspect  of  Bezeq’s  financial  vigor  is  presented  in  Table  6  describing  the 
liquidity stream that the company generated in the last dozen years. As soon as Bezeq got rid 
of its waiting list it embarked on an ambitious investment program to convert all its switching 
equipment from analogue to digital switching technology, financing the mass investments 
through the allocation to depreciation and using the company’s burgeoning profits. By 1996, 
when the program ended, Bezeq discovered that the fast growth of the fixed lines market had 
come  to  a  halt,  and  the  company  found  itself  with  an  excess  of  switching  and  network 
capacity. Facing a sharp decline in the cost of equipment (at an annual decline of 10 percent) 
triggered by world prices and reinforced by the company’s increased pressure on its domestic 
suppliers, the company cut its investment by half. The large allocation to depreciation (which 
is embedded in the tariffs), and the large profitability, on one hand, and the low investment on 
the other, generated an unprecedented liquidity stream of over 400 million dollars annually. 
  Part of this stream was diverted to cover the losses of the Bezeq subsidiaries, but most 
of  it  was  used  to  pay  back  the  debts  the  company  incurred  in  its  early  years.  Not  less 
important were the resources diverted to allow future cost cuts. Since its birth the Bezeq was 
plagued by excess labor costs. The liquidity stream allowed it to offer its costly employees 
generous early retirement plans to reduce its inflated wage bill. 
It was estimated that the tariff reduction reduced Bezeq's revenue over the period by about 
5 billion dollars. The regulator was, however, careful not to undercut the company’s financial 
stability. Bezeq’s average annual profits (before taxes) in the pre-regulatory era (1984-1989) 
were 60 million dollars. Average annual profits grew to 200 million dollars since the initiation 
of the regulatory regime, and this level was hardly affected by the loss of the company's most 
lucrative operation- the international calls. 
  Bezeq's annual profits were on average twice the normative profits. Do these excess 
profits reflect a failure of the regulatory regime? In some sense, the answer is positive. As 
                                                            
36￿ See fn. 8, ￿￿ 23
figures 5 and 6 indicate Bezeq succeeded in showing excess profits even in 1994 and 1999, in 
spite of the tariff cuts by the review committees. These excess profits can be explained by the 
committees’ conservative approach and by the leniency of the political level when it had to 
fix the adjustment rates
37.   
  The owners of the firm benefited only little from these excess profits. As table 6 
indicates, only a small fraction of these profits were distributed as dividends (about one-eight 
of the after-tax profit). In September 1990 the Bezeq stock was issued for the first time on the 
Israeli Stock Exchange at a market value of 1.25 billion dollars (in 2002 prices). In May 2005 
the government sold its controlling interest in the company at a price of 3.14 billion dollars, 
reflecting a rate of return of 7.3 percent for the whole period
38.  
  Table  6  points  out  the  great  winners  from  Bezeq’s  profitability.  These  were  the 
company’s employees. One quarter of the profits went to finance the early retirement plans. 
The excess profits benefited also, though indirectly, the phone service consumers. The profits 
allowed the reductions in finance and labor expenditures mandated by the tariff cuts.  At no 
point in this process did the rate-cuts look threatening to the company's financial stability, and 
the  generous  retirement  plans  prevented  any  serious  workers'  unrest,  easing  the  political 





      F. The Regulator’s Impact on Bezeq’s Productivity 
The regulator played an instrumental role in the recovery of Bezeq’s profitability in the early 
90s, and its preservation in spite of the loss of the lucrative international calls market in 1997. 
It is of interest, however, to explore to what extent the increased profits were attained through 
an increase in the company’s revenues, and how much of the increase is due to a reduction in 
costs. According to figures 7 and 8 the answer differs between the first and the second half of 
                                                            
37￿The committees' conservative approach is reflected in the second review committee's decision to 
recommend a moderate cut of 10 percent instead of the 16 percent, the rate it thought appropriate. 
Moreover, all the committees based their estimates of the tariff cut on the company's performance 
during the previous year, rather than try and forecast its performance in the first year of the new 
review period, thus ignoring any productivity growth over the two years. 
38￿At the height of the stock bubble, in March 2002, the stock of the company hit a value of 4.9 billion, 
yielding an annual rate of return of 15.6 percent. ￿￿ 24
the regulatory era. Whereas the recovery of profits in the early 90s is explained by the fast 
growth in output and revenue, cost increases lagging behind, the profitability of Bezeq D-O 
in the second half of the 90s is explained primarily by costs reductions. Increased productivity 
played, therefore, an important role in explaining Bezeq’s booming profits, and the natural 
question is how much did the regulatory regime contribute to this process? 
A simple answer can be found in Bezeq’s management and Board of Directors' resolutions 
calling for increases in efficiency to meet the review committees’ tariff cuts. This seemingly 
simplistic  answer  is  supported  by  Figures  7  and  8.  Whereas  in  the  pre-regulatory  era 
expenditures outpaced the growth of output, leading to an annual growth of 1.5 percent of the 
cost per unit of output, cost per unit of output declined at an annual  rate of 6.2 percent in the 
period 1990-1996 and the rate accelerated to 8.4 percent thereafter
40. The costs decline that 
was initially confined to capital costs, spread in the second period also to operating costs, 
including labor costs. 
 The fast expansion in the late 80s, and the huge investment it required, were financed 
primarily through increased credit. It is the increase in capital costs (finance charges and 
depreciation) that explain the increased cost per unit of output in the pre-regulatory era. The 
new tariff regime, introduced in 1990, allowed Bezeq to self finance the huge investments 
required for the conversion to digital equipment, and use its improved profitability to pay 
back some of its debt in order to reduce its finance charges. Finally, the declining investment 
in the late 90s and the ample liquidity enjoyed by the company allowed it to get rid of most of 
its  debt,  reducing  finance  charges  to  a  minimum,  and  trimming  down  its  depreciation 
allowances. 
 
As impressive as is the decline in capital costs (an annual decline of 10 percent in the 
period 1997-2002), regulatory pressure contributed only marginally to the process. It led to 
increased  effort  exerted  by  Bezeq's  management  when  bargaining  with  the  company's 
suppliers, and may explain the conservative investment policy in the late 90s. However, much 
of this achievement is due to exogenous factors, such as the decline in equipment prices on 
the world market, that were independent of the regulator’s intervention. If one looks for an 
unambiguous regulatory impact, one has to look at management’s effort to cut operation cost. 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
39￿ The Bezeq workers union initiated several times service interruptions, following the publication of the 
committees' reports. These interruptions were, however, relatively mild. In recent years the threat of more 
serious interruptions was curtailed by the high penetration rate of cellular phones. ￿￿ 25
The slowdown of costs increases from 8 percent in the pre-regulatory era to 4 percent in the 
early 90s, and the decline of operation costs at an annual rate of 3 percent towards the end of 
the period bear definitely the imprints of regulatory pressure. 
  Nowhere is this pressure more discernable than in Bezeq’s management effort to wear 
down  the  hardcore  of  inefficiency  –  labor  costs.  Wage  and  salary  expenses  constitute 
throughout the period over 60 percent of Bezeq’s operation costs. Bezeq’s employees, like 
employees of other government-owned public utility companies, were the prime beneficiaries 
of  their  company’s  monopolistic  status.  Prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  new  regulatory 
regime Bezeq’s employees real wage bill increased at an annual rate of 10 percent. A measure 
of management’s success is the slowdown of the increase in these expenses to 3 percent in the 
period 1990-1996, and the reduction in the wage bill at an annual rate of 1 percent in the 
period 1997-2002. Even more impressive is the management’s success in cutting down the 
company’s  inflated  workforce,  firing  “expensive”  employees  and  replacing  them  by  less 
expensive ones. 
Figure 9 describes the changes in Bezeq’s labor force, the wage bill, and the changes in 
the wage per employee. The first years of Bezeq’s independent existence were characterized 
by a fast growth of its labor force (18 percent in 5 years), a trend that stopped only in 1992. 
The shift from analogue to digital switching technology, and increased regulatory pressure led 
management to embark on a workforce-cuts policy to which it stuck throughout the rest of the 
period. In its first years the policy affected mainly the temporary labor force, but with time the 
cuts expanded to incorporate also tenured employees. As a result, Bezeq’s labor force in 2001 
was 28 percent lower than its level in 1985 and 40 percent lower than the level it attained, at 
its  peak,  in  1992.  The  reduction  of  the  labor  force  by  4800  employees  was  clearly  an 
important factor contributing to Bezeq’s increased productivity. 
These  employment  cuts  did  not  come  without  cost.  Part  of  the  cost  of  obtaining  the 
union’s consent to these cuts was the generous retirement arrangements for those who left the 
company. The other part was the generous wage contract enjoyed by those who stayed. The 
union’s cooperation was won at a price of a continuous increase in the average wage per 
employee.  In  the  period  1995-2001  the average  real  wage  of  Bezeq employees  doubled, 
compared with an increase of 70 percent in the wage of public employees, and an  increase of 
50 percent for the economy as a whole. Since the change in the average wage per worker was 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
￿
40 The growth in output is measured as a weighted average of the growth in lines and the growth in 
traffic, the weights being  0.6 and 0.4, respectively.￿￿￿ 26
accompanied  by  a  change  in  Bezeq’s  labor  force  composition  -  the  retirement  of  older 
“expensive” employees and  the  entrance  of  young  “cheaper” employees,  the  100  percent 
wage gain understates the true increase in real wages. This increase in wages offsets a large 
part  of  the  effect  of  the  labor  force  decline.  In  the  period  1992-2001,  the  company’s 
workforce was cut by 40 percent, but its wage expenses went down only by 9 percent. 
If the average wage at Bezeq would have grown at a rate identical to the national average, 
the company would have saved over these years the sum of almost 0.8 billion dollars (in 2002 
prices). In 1982 the government agreed to award the workers substantial wage increases in 
order to gain the union’s approval for their change in status from government employees to 
employees of an independent company. Our estimate of 0.8 billion understates, therefore, the 
rent the employees received in the form of inflated wage If we add to this amount the 0.6 
billion they received in the form of increased retirement benefits, the workers are clearly the 
main beneficiaries of the company’s monopolistic status. Bezeq is another example of an 
inherent paradox in the operation  of a government monopoly -  it  has to  pay in terms of 
increased wages for any increase in productivity! 
To what extent did Bezeq’s actual costs follow to the trajectory of normative ("allowed") 
costs  prescribed  by  the  review  committees?  The  comparison  in  figure  10  of  actual  and 
normative  costs  shows  a  different  pattern  of  behavior  in  the  first  two  review  periods 
(1990-1993,  1994-1998)  and  the  third  one  (1999-2002).  In  the  first  two  periods  the 
company’s  costs  followed  the  norm  for  the  first  two  years  of  each  review  period,  but 
exceeded  the  norm  as  the  end  of  the  review  period  approached.  The  review  committees 
suspected that the divergence was not accidental, but rather part of a calculated policy aimed 
to set a higher benchmark for tariffs in the following period. Consequently, the committees 
ignored the increased costs, forcing Bezeq to slash its costs in order to maintain its profit 
targets. It seems that the lesson has been learned, and almost throughout the third review 
period  actual  costs  fell  short  of  the  normative  ones.  The  improved  fit  of  actual  and  the 
normative costs can be given two interpretations: the first interpretation attributes the better fit 
to  the  committee’s  improved  forecast  of  the  company’s  efficiency  potential.  The  second 
interpretation  regards  the  “normative  costs”  as  a  disciplinary  device.  According  to  this 
interpretation, the setting of norms played an important role in restraining the increase in the 
monopoly’s expenditures in the early 90s and in their reduction at the end of that decade. 
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G. Theory and Reality – Some Lessons based on the Israeli Experience 
Neoclassical  economic  theory  emphasized  the  disruptive  effect  of  monopolies  on  the 
allocation of resources and the distribution of welfare between consumers and the owners of 
the monopolistic firm. The new regulation literature added to the monopoly evils the sin of 
inefficiency, but the emphasis was shifted from the discussion of the problems of monopolies 
to  the  problems  of  regulating  these  monopolies.  If  the  early  literature  focused  on  the 
monopoly's reaction to the regulatory rules (for example, the Averch-Johnson effect) the new 
literature analyzes the regulator's behavior, given his objective function and the constraints he 
faces. Though economists agree that the regulator is attempting to maximize his own welfare, 
there is disagreement on how the regulator’s welfare is related to the welfare of the agents 
affected by his decisions (consumers and firms), and how he attains his aims. At one extreme, 
the regulator is depicted as captured by the firms, and at the other extreme the regulator is 
assumed to identify fully with the consumers, adopting an opportunistic policy that sacrifices 
profits  for  lower  prices  (Newbery,  1999).  A  major  constraint  affecting  the  regulator, 
according to this literature, is the scarcity of information, and specifically the asymmetry in 
information between the firm and its regulator. Not less important, but perhaps even less 
tangible, are institutional constraints (Levy and Spiller, 1994), and specifically, the regulator’s 
independence (Edwards and Waverman, 2006).  
       The new economics of regulation literature reflects, to a large extent, the U.S. experience, 
and gained impetus with the increasing popularity of privatization.  It is worthwhile to explore 
the extent to which these observations apply to the pre-privatization era. After all private 
ownership of public utilities was quite rare in most economies till the mid ‘90s
41, and the 
regulators’  formative  years  were,  most  probably,  spent  confronting  a  publicly-owned 
monopoly. At first sight our story does not fit this model, since in Israel throughout the two 
decades  covered  by  our  discussion  a  publicly  owned  monopolist  faced  a  government 
controlled  regulator.  But  in  second  thought  there  is  a  lot  to  be  learned  from  the  Israeli 
experience on the behavior of the regulated firm in the pre-privatization era, and some of the 
lessons derived from the Israeli regulator's behavior seem to apply to the regulatory process in 
general. 
 
                                                            
41￿The only public utility industry in Israel that was not dominated at the time by a government owned 
monopoly was public transport which was dominated by two large cooperatives.  ￿￿ 28
The profit motive played only a secondary role in the Israeli government's objective 
function  guiding  the  operation  of  the  public  utility  industries.  Employment  has  always 
preceded profit in the government's list of priorities. During the late '70s and early '80s the top 
place on the list was shared by macro considerations: what effect will tariff changes have on 
the rate of inflation. This attitude did not change much when Bezeq became an independent 
entity. The low role of profits in the owner's list of priorities is reflected in the minor role 
played by the Government Companies Authority in both the liberalization and the regulation 
of the public utility industries
42. The vacancy left by the owners was filled by the workers' 
union.  They  regarded  the  company's  profitability  as  essential  to  the  preservation  of  their 
generous wage arrangements, and they were in the forefront of the fight against any attempt to 
curtail the companies' profitability either through liberalization or through regulation
43. The 
“workers’ capture” of the monopoly had far reaching implications for the regulator's objective 
function, the constraints he faces and the aims of regulation.  
The model of "regulatory capture", formulated by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), 
foresees  regulated  firms  offering  former  regulators  lucrative  appointments.  Applying  this 
model to the Israeli experience one has to distinguish between the professional level in the 
regulating  bodies  and  the  political  level.  As  long  as  the  public  utility  companies  were 
government owned, and, hence, subject to the public employees' pay-scales the tendency of 
members  of  the  professional  level  to  move  to  the  regulated  firms  was  relatively  rare. 
Ironically,  it  has  become  much  more  prevalent  once  the  industries  have  been  opened  to 
competition, and these workers could use their specific skills in the private sector working for 
the  new  entrants
44.  The  political  level,  on  the  other  end,  has  shown  little  capacity  to 
accumulate the specialist's knowledge that regulated firms may find worth paying for
45. In 
                                                            
42￿   The  Government  Companies  Authority  is  part  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  However,  the  unit 
responsible for the liberalization and regulation of the public utility industries in the Ministry was the 
Bureau of the Budget. The Government Companies Authority has turned into a major player in the 
public utility industries only in the late '90s when the government embarked on its privatization drive. 
43￿ The pattern characteristic of Bezeq's workers' union applies also to those in the Israeli Electric 
Company,  the  ports,  the  Israeli  Refineries,  fuel  pipelines  and  storage  companies,  and  the  water 
company. 
44￿ The incentive of obtaining a leading job with one of the new entrants must have affected also 
Bezeq's management. Success in running Bezeq, one of the largest companies in the country, can serve 
as a signal to one's managerial skills. 
45￿   The  frequent  turnover  of  ministers  among  the  different  ministries  reduces  their  capacity  to 
accumulate the specialized skills required in any specific industry. The only exceptions are lawyers ￿￿ 29
their case the reward is, therefore, not pecuniary but has to be measured in terms of political 
power. In the Israeli political arena workers' unions carry a much greater weight with the two 
large  parties  than  with  the  smaller  ones.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  liberalization  of  the 
telecommunication market was led by two ministers who represented small parties that were 
not subject to the workers’ union pressure
46. When it came to rate setting, union pressure on 
the political level turned out to be ineffective where the rate cuts at the beginning of the 
review  periods were  concerned, but  resulted  in the reduction of the adjustment rates (X) 
proposed  by  the  committees
47.  Newbery  (1999),  worried  of  the  regulator's  exploitative 
behavior,  draws  a  picture  of  "a  mass  of  local  voting  consumers"  facing  a  politically 
defenseless owner. Nothing can be further away from the reality of the Israeli political arena, 
where an  unorganized  consumer  public  faced a  well  organized  workers’  union  forcefully 
defending the rents they derived through Bezeq's monopolistic status. Newbery observes that 
"under  public  ownership,  interest  groups  will  compete  in  the  political  market  place  for 
benefits, while under private ownership, the regulator will represent the interests of the non-
owning groups". The Israeli experience clearly supports the first observation, but indicates 
that the representation of the consumer public by the regulator is not, necessarily, confined to 
the case where the monopoly is privately owned.  
The small weight given to profit maximization in the owner's objective function made 
increased productive efficiency the prime target of the regulator. Allocative efficiency played 
only a secondary role in the regulator's priorities in the early phases of the new regulatory era. 
True that the resources allocated to communication services till the mid '80s were too small 
from  an  economic  perspective,  but  this  misallocation  was  not  motivated  by  profit 
maximization, but rather by general government inefficiency.  
The increased emphasis on productive efficiency would have called for performance-
based ratemaking. Laffont and Tirole (1993, 2000, p.39) phrased the term “the power of the 
incentive scheme”. In their formulation,  c p p ) 1 ( r - + = , where r denotes the power of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
serving in the legislative or the executive branches who can take advantage of the knowledge they 
have accumulated on the regulatory process itself. 
46￿ For many years the Ministry of Communication ranked as a ministry of secondary importance, 
increasing the probability that it will be headed by a minister from a small party. Periods when the 
ministry was headed by a representative of one of the large parties were in general characterized by 
lack of reform. 
47￿ The parliamentary hearing of the last cut in Bezeq's tariffs in 2003 was attended by more members 
of the union's secretariat than members of the regulatory ministries. The parliamentary committee 
decided to reduce the adjustment rate from 3.5 (the rate approved by the Ministers) to 2.5 percent. ￿￿ 30
incentive scheme  (0￿£ r £1), and c denotes cost.  In a high powered incentive scheme the 
price is insensitive to changes in costs p = p , while in a low powered incentive scheme (i.e., 
perfect passthrough price setting) p= c, and a change in cost hardly affects the firm’s profit. A 
major constraint in the choice of r is, as Laffont and Tirole emphasize, the regulator’s stock 
of information. 
The Israeli example demonstrates the Laffont and Tirole argument.   The high priority 
given by the regulator to productive efficiency would have called from the start to chose a 
tariff setting menu where r =1. In effect we observed that the first review committee adopt a 
passthrough policy, adopting Bezeq’s realized costs as the normative cost base. The rationale 
for this choice was the regulator’s attempt to dispel the company’s fear of exploitation, and 
the lack of information. The same reasons explain the low adjustment rates (X) applied in the 
first review period. The accumulation of information allowed the second review committee to 
choose  a  price  setting  recipe  where  “controllable”  costs  are  assigned  a  fixed  price  but 
“uncontrollable” costs are adopted as is. Finally, the third and fourth review committees set a 
fixed  price  formula  based  on  normative  costs.  The  more  ambitious  adjustment  rates  (X) 
adopted by the second review committee and it successors can also be traced to the increased 
accumulation of knowledge by the regulator. 
However, the Israeli experience demonstrates also a point that is sometimes forgotten. 
The completeness of information and the asymmetry in information between the regulator and 
the firm are not exogenous. The investment in information is endogenous, and depends on the 
cost  and  returns  of  the  investment.  The  returns  to  information  increase  with  competitive 
pressure and with the power of the regulatory scheme. A company used for decades to a rate 
setting based on ‘cost-plus’ had little use for a costly information system, and￿spent on its 
accounting system only the minimum required by its creditors and the Securities Exchange 
Authority.  It  was  the  increased  emphasis  on  productive  efficiency,  and  the  increased 
competition from the mobile companies that made Bezeq realize the importance of a more 
sophisticated information system.
48  
           Paradoxically, the asymmetry between the regulator and the firm may have increased 
over time. At the starting point there was a full symmetry between Bezeq and its regulators – 
the  accumulated  knowledge  on  demand  and  cost  conditions  of  both  parties  was  scant. 
Moreover, as long as Bezeq was a monopoly providing domestic, international and mobile 
phone services, it did not make any effort to conceal its information. Its statistical abstract 
                                                            
48￿It is worth remembering that it was the regulator who initiated Bezeq’s first costing system ￿￿ 31
was easily accessible and contained a wide variety of information on the company’s technical 
and financial activity. Bezeq’s attitude changed once its market opened to competition and the 
information was regarded a commercial secret
49.  
Why in the absence of local information did the regulator not rely on benchmarking? 
Armstrong,  Cowan  and  Vickers  (1994,  ch.3)  argue  that  the  attractiveness  of  yardstick 
competition increases with the correlation between the cost of the regulated company and the 
cost of the companies for which the information exists. The correlation may be low when the 
industry  is  in  the  midst  of  fast  technological  changes.  Differences  in  the  vintage  of  the 
technology  (for  example  the  shift  from  analogue  to  digital  switching  equipment  or  from 
copper to fiber optic network) will create significant differences in costs
50. Not less important 
are differences in the cost of labor which depend crucially on the relative power of unions in 
the various companies. Finally, the cost comparison may reflect not differences in technology 
or input prices, but rather the success of regulators to curtail costs. Consequently, the Israeli 
review committees preferred to rely on the local experience rather than employ international 
comparisons. 
The first review committee called its recommended rate setting method “price-cap”. In 
effect, the proposed procedure never satisfied the definition, since, officially, the regulated 
firm was never given the discretion to set the tariffs for its various services (subject to an 
average rate restriction). The first committee set this restriction because it felt that Bezeq 
lacked the information required for this exercise. The reluctance of the following committees 
to transfer the power of detailed rate-setting to the company is explained by their fear that 
Bezeq, given the oncoming opening of the markets (the international and later the domestic) 
to competition, will take advantage of this power to set anti-competitive prices
51. It took, 
however, almost a decade before the regulator himself acquired sufficient information (and 
self confidence) to propose a radical overhaul of the tariff structure. 
                                                            
49￿Bezeq stopped publishing its statistical abstract in 1997. A similar phenomena of concealment of 
information is reported by Taylor (1994,ch.11) for the US long distance market. 
50￿Bezeq was fortunate in being a relatively latecomer to the field. As a result it had only relatively 
small resources invested in the old technology,  allowing it to adopt the more efficient equipment 
faster￿ . 
51Bezeq’s policy of cutting international rates prior to the liberalization of the international market 
(p.19) and some of the rate programs to bulk customers proposed by Bezeq in the late ‘90s offering a 
discount-scale that increases over time (resulting in  increased cost of separation to the customer) were 
definitely meant as a threat to any new entrant into these markets.  ￿￿ 32
Allocating common costs the committee followed other Western regulatory authorities 
in  rejecting  Ramsey  pricing  in  favor  of  an  amended  proportional  markup  formula.  The 
committee’s main concern was the distributive effect of the Ramsey pricing method, and 
specifically, the sharp increase in the access tariffs it implied. At the same time it was also 
aware of the difficulty in convincing the consumer public of the benefits of a “single till” 
approach (Laffont and Tirole, 2000,  pp 73-80). The committee was ever-conscious of its 
advisory status, and felt that a recommendation involving a sharp rise in the monthly user-fee 
might undermine its credibility with the parliamentary Finance Committee, and jeopardize the 
whole recommendation package. It settled, therefore, for modest increases in the monthly user 
fee, though it meant that phone traffic had to be charged an inflated markup (of over 200 
percent) to cover the common costs. 
The committee's dilemma is best explained by table 7. The table describes Bezeq's 
revenue from access and traffic for the year 1998, the committee's estimate of the direct costs 
of these services, and the company's output, where access is measured by the number of lines 
(in  thousands)  and  traffic  is  measured  as  a  weighted  number  of  minutes  (in  millions). 
Common costs allocated to telephony constituted over one-half of the direct costs (almost 300 
million  dollar).  The  problem  of  the  allocation  of  common  costs  was  aggravated  by  the 
imbalance between access and traffic in revenue and costs. Whereas access constituted only 
one-third  of  revenue,  it  constituted  almost  70  percent  of  direct  costs.  According  to  the 
committee's estimates, the  1998 annual user  fees of  $126 fell short of the average direct 
access costs ($136). Assuming that the demand elasticities for access and traffic are  -0.1 and 
-0.5, respectively, and ignoring (for simplicity) the cross-elasticity, a proportionate markup of 
45 percent to cover the common costs, would have required an increase in the user fees by 57 
percent, and allowed a cut of 66 percent in traffic tariffs (a cut from 2.3 cents per minute to 
0.8 cents).
 52  Ramsey pricing would have required a user-fee hike of almost 90 percent and 
the lowering of traffic tariffs by three-quarters.  
Bezeq’s 1998 revenue exceeded normative costs (direct plus common costs) by more 
than a quarter. Consequently, both rate programs involve a substantial cut in the "average" 
rate, and  a  significant increase  in  the consumer  surplus.  The  difference  between  the two 
                                                            
52￿Hausman, Tardiff and Belinfante (1993) show that allowing for the cross-elasticities between access 
and intercity tariffs mitigates considerably the welfare loss associated with the increase in the access 
charges. Allowing for these elasticities, given their low estimates, does not change the results of our 
exercise. ￿￿ 33
methods in the consumer surplus generated by the rate  changes  is, however, surprisingly 
small – only 2 percent
53.  
The committee, worried that such sharp increases in user-fees would be unacceptable 
to the Finance Committee, shied away from both recommendations. The user fee was set 
equal to the average direct cost of access ($136) and the common costs were fully assigned to 
traffic. The calculation shows, that in spite of the imperfect pricing formula, the difference 
between the consumer surplus generated by this method and by Ramsey pricing is only one-
eighth
54. 
The results in table 7 are not accidental. Formally, assuming the firm produces two 
independent services subject to a zero profit constraint 
                                      m1R1 + m2R2 = A, 
where mi  denotes the markup rate [mi = ( pi -ci )/ pi], Ri denotes the expenditures on service i, 
and A denotes the common costs. Differentiating, and assuming marginal costs are constant, 
one obtains the compensating price changes under price-cap 
                                         dln p2 / dln p1 =  - R1 (1- m1￿1) / R2 (1- m2￿2 ) 
The resulting change in consumer surplus equals 
                                             d CS =  - (R1 dln p1 + R2 dln p2 ), 
which given the price-cap constraint equals 
                              d CS =  {[(1- m1￿1) / (1- m2￿2 )] – 1} R1 dln p1. 
Hence the price of service 1 should be raised as long as  m1￿1< m2￿2, which is the Ramsey 
formula.  However,  the  formula  also  indicates  that  the  increase  in  consumer  surplus  is 
diminishing  with  the  change  in  prices,  so  fine-tuning  may  not  be  worth  the  effort. 
Specifically, if there exists a bias towards the welfare of the consumers of the service with the 
lower price elasticity (say, access), then the change in social welfare equals  
                                             d CS =  - (￿R1 dln p1 + R2 dln p2 ), 
where ￿> 1 denotes the bias coefficient. In this case rebalancing should proceed only as long 
as  [(1- m1￿1) / (1- m2￿2 )] > ￿ . Given the data in table 8 even a relatively small bias in favor 
of the consumers of access (￿ = 1.15) would have made a proportionate markup socially 
                                                            
53￿ When elasticities are constant the change in consumer surplus equals ￿R/(1+￿), where ￿R denotes  
the change in expenditures (i.e., revenue) and ￿ is the demand elasticity of the specific service. 
54￿The figures in table 8 differ somewhat from the committee's final recommendations, mainly because 
the latter were based on the assumption of completely inelastic demand curves. Our calculations yield 
very similar results of the change in consumer surplus when we assume that the price elasticities of 
access and traffic are 0.05 and 0.75, respectively, or when we use the 2002 data.   ￿￿ 34
desirable. In general, the bias coefficient that will make a proportionate markup (m1 = m2 = m) 
socially optimal satisfies 
                                         ￿ -1 = (￿2 - ￿1) / [(1/m) - ￿2 ] 
The coefficient will not differ substantially from one as long as the markup (m) is sufficiently 
small and the difference in elasticities is not too large. 
 
There was another reason why the committee did not consider Ramsey pricing namely 
the asymmetry in resources between the regulator and the regulated company. The regulatory 
process is costly to both the regulator and the company. But whereas the first acts within a 
well restricted budget, the company is bound only by the profit constraint. It will be ready to 
invest in additional information, or consulting services, as the long as the expected returns 
exceed the marginal cost. If a consultant (or a lobbyist) could have promised Bezeq that the 
rate cut would be reduced by 1 percentage point, his effort would be worth to the company 10 
million dollars. To offset this imbalance the committees tried to keep their recommendations 
as simple and transparent as possible. Ramsey pricing does not satisfy this criterion. 
The estimation of demand elasticities for telecommunication services has become a 
common procedure in the US regulatory regime. It is less common in Europe, and has never 
been undertaken in Israel. The committees felt that moving into this untapped territory would 
have entangled them in lengthy controversies on secondary issues. The committees feared that 
Bezeq would try to utilize the elasticity estimates to lower tariffs of services where it has 
competitive disadvantage, and raise the tariffs of services where its monopolistic status was 
secure. Bezeq's proposal to introduce a countrywide uniform rate for all phone calls showed 
that the fear was not imaginary. The proposal was intended to increase the price differential 
between Bezeq and its mobile phone competitors in  the  inter-city segment of the market 
(where its cost margin was quite slim) at the expense of the tariff of local calls, where the 
company did not fear competition. A similar concern led the committees to calculate the rate 
cuts assuming zero demand elasticities and basing the calculation on current output, though 
they were aware that in a growing market this calculation method will not eliminate excess 
profits
55. 
The issue of the proper markup formula became in particular bothersome when the 
third review committee set, for the first time, the interconnect rates. The committee faced a 
                                                            
55￿For a discussion of the proper weighting scheme of output see Armstrong, Cowan, Vickers (1994) 
and Sappington (2002). ￿￿ 35
mixture of rates set mostly by the Minister of Communication and reflecting the relative 
power of Bezeq and the interconnecting company (cellular phone or international calls). On 
the basis of its estimate of the direct cost of a regular call the committee had no difficulty 
calculating the cost of an interconnect call, but had a difficult time deciding how to assign the 
common cost. It rejected ECPR, which would have meant assigning a 200 percent markup, 
the same markup assigned to regular calls. It also felt uneasy with the single-till assumption 
underlying Ramsey pricing. The solution adopted was a compromise: since a regular call 
involves two Bezeq switches, and an interconnect call only one, the markup was set at a rate 
which is only one half that of a regular call. It is worth noting that though the argumentation 
may be unacceptable to Ramsey pricing disciples, the result is in line with Ramsey principles 
given the greater price elasticity of mobile and international calls.
56 Edwards and Waverman 
(2006) hypothesized that the smaller is the regulator’s independence the more he will favor 
the publicly owned incumbent when setting interconnect rates. The Israeli observations are 
clearly not consistent with this hypothesis- the interconnect rates established by the committee 
being among the lowest in Europe.
 57  
Institutional constraints may explain also another deviation of the Israeli rate-setting 
formula  from  its  UK  model.  According  to  the  price-cap  method  the  price  trajectory  is 
determined  solely  by  one  parameter-  the  adjustment  factor  X.  The  Israeli  ad-hoc  review 
committees adopted a two-stage system, consisting of a discrete change at the beginning of 
each review period, and a gradual change (determined by X) during the review period. The 
discrete change was based on the committees’ calculations of the monopoly’s “excesses” (i.e., 
the excess profit and excess costs) in the previous period, while the adjustment factor X was 
based on their evaluation of future cost savings (due to increases in output, returns to scale, a 
decline in the price of equipment, and cut downs of superfluous labor). The first committee 
chose  the  two-stage  formula  because  it  recommended  an  initial  rate  hike.  The  following 
committees did not change it when they discovered that it was much easier to convince the 
politically  oriented  decision  makers  of  the  validity  of  their  estimates  of  Bezeq’s  past 
performance than of its future efficiency potential. 
 
                                                            
56￿   A  lower  markup  on  interconnect  than  regular  calls  would  have  also  been  recommended  by 
proponents of Armstrong's "replacement ratio" approach (Armstrong, 2002, p.311) 
57 Under the price-cap rules, setting lower interconnect rates would not have affected the monopoly’s 
profitability, since it would have called for higher local call rates.  
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Newbery raises the fear of the exploitative nature of regulation –a regulator ready to 
sacrifice  profits  for  lower  prices,  thus  undermining  the  company's  capacity  to  renew  its 
equipment. Some may cite the low normative rates of return (8.5 percent for the first eight 
years of the regulatory regime and 10.5 and 13 percent later on) as supporting this view. The 
committees, however, familiar with Bezeq's performance knew that the normative rate was 
just a "floor" for the company's profitability, and should the company face a major unexpected 
threat  to  its  profitability-  the  regulator  will  intervene.  The  reduction  of  the  X-factor,  to 
compensate the monopoly for the opening of the international market to competition, proved 
the committees correct
58. Given Bezeq's profits record it seems natural to blame the regulator 
for excess leniency. Afraid that the erosion of the company's profitability may affect their 
own credibility, the committees were not severe enough in their recommendations of rate 
cuts.  
Finally, in their evaluation of the Price-cap system several researchers (Laffont-Tirole, 
2000 ch.2; Sappington, 2002) voiced the fear that a rigorous control of prices may affect 
service  quality.  In  the  case  of  the  Israeli  telecommunication  industry  this  fear  has  not 
materialized.  The  switch  from  analogue  to  digital  technology  in  the  early  '90s,  and  the 
competition with the cellular phone (and the threat of entry) assured the Israeli consumer of a 
constant improvement both in the scope and the quality of service.  
 
H. Summary and Conclusions 
Bezeq has come a long way since it became an independent company two decades ago. Its 
road was shaped by technological change and structural reforms, but not less important was 
the interaction between the company and its regulators. 
Since  the  establishment  of  the  new  regulatory  regime  in  1990  real  phone  rates 
declined at an annual rate of 4 percent. Even more impressive, the decline of the regulated 
domestic fixed line rates outpaced, in the last nine years, those of the competitive industries - 
the mobile phone and the international calls.  
Since 1994 the rate decline has been accompanied by a complete overhaul of the rate 
structure to reflect the services' costs. The main achievement of this restructuring effort was 
the rebalancing of access and traffic rates. In 1994, when the process started, the ratio of the 
monthly fee and the rate per minute was 24, in 2003 this ratio increased to 400. The sharp cuts 
                                                            
58￿Sappington (2002) calls this type of correction the Z-factor. ￿￿ 37
in cross- subsidization laid the groundwork for the opening of the domestic communication 
market to competition. 
Regulation is in general associated with a decline in the regulated company's profit. 
The Israeli regulator succeeded in balancing consumers' welfare and the company's financial 
stability. The company's annual profit, which averaged 60 mullion US dollars prior to the 
initiation of the new regulatory regime, grew to an average of 200 millions afterwards. This 
achievement is in particular noteworthy given the spin-off of Bezeq major profit center – the 
international calls market. The company was privatized in May 2005. The annual rate of 
return on the company's stock, since it was  originally issued in 1990, was 7.3 percent. 
The  excess  profitability  enjoyed  by  Bezeq  allowed  it  to  face  the  strict  efficiency 
requirements imposed by the regulator. The company was able to cut its cost per unit, at first 
because of the fast growth in output and later by cutting absolute costs. The cost cuts were 
achieved through reduction in the company's finance costs, and, more important, by cuts of its 
inflated labor costs. To attain the cuts in its labor force the company had to raise the wage of 
those remaining. The great beneficiaries of the large profits were, therefore, the company's 
employees, whose share in the rent, in the form of inflated wages and generous severance- 
pay arrangements, exceeded 0.8 billion US dollars.  
The theoretical literature emphasizes the asymmetry in information between the firm 
and its regulator which forces the regulator to compromise on his allocative and distribution 
goals. The Israeli experience demonstrates some of the shortcomings of the static analysis. 
The stock of knowledge is not constant. To judge by the Israeli experience, the regulative 
process  can  serve  as  a  stimulus  for  the  accumulation  of  information,  and  the  rate  of 
accumulation is no less important than the asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated 
firm. Similarly, the literature ignores the asymmetry in means (financial and legal) between 
the two sides in this legal scramble. His inferiority will force the regulator to adopt a simple 
and transparent policy, even if a more complex policy (for example, Ramsey pricing) would 
have led to gains in efficiency. 
The  regulator’s  achievements  are  in  particular  noteworthy  given  the  institutional 
constraints. The Israeli regulator has never gained the degree of independence enjoyed by his 
European and American counterparts. A major part in the rate setting process was played by 
ad-hoc review committees, but the committees were granted only an advisory role, the final 
decision  resting  with  politically  oriented  decision  makers  (the  Ministers  of  Finance  and 
Communication and the Parliamentary Finance Committee). The ad-hoc committees, aware of ￿￿ 38
the parliament members’ distributive concerns, mitigated their recommendation concerning 
the pace of rebalancing. 
The  competition  in  the  domestic  communication  market  was  slow  in  coming.  A 
natural question is how good a substitute was regulation for competition? There is no simple 
answer to this question. The experience of competition in the European fixed lines markets   
is too brief to lead to lead to any clear-cut conclusions. If we were to judge on the basis of the 
rate of decline of the Israeli and European phone rates- the Israeli regulator did a very good 
job.  Furthermore,  even  in  Europe  the  decline  cannot  be  attributed  fully  to  the  forces  of 
competition,  and  the  regulators  played  an  important  role  in  accelerating  the  process 
(Newbery, 2000 pp. 322-328). 
The comparison of the price changes in the regulated domestic market and those in the 
competitive mobile phone and international calls markets is illuminating. The price levels in 
both  markets  prior  to  liberalization  were  artificially  high  relative  to  the  industries'  cost 
structure. In both markets the newcomers were chosen in an open bid were the determining 
criterion was the price of service. The winners offered to slash existing prices by tens of 
percents, and the incumbent had to adjust to this new competitive environment immediately. 
It is doubtful whether any regulator could have attained the results attained by the anonymous 
forces of competition.  
On the other hand, one should not ignore the continuity of the regulatory process. The 
decline in the domestic phone rates continued persistently throughout the last 15 years. The 
price setting in the competitive market can be broken into two stages: the "penetration" stage 
of the new competitors into the new market is characterized, as we have noted, by a sharp rate 
cut. However, once the market split in the new market stabilizes the rate decline is replaced 
by a slow but steady crawl of rates upward. 
Newbery (1999, p.127) summarizes the lessons to be drawn from the first decade of 
privatization:” The main lesson to draw is that the quality of regulation is a key determinant 
of  performance  whether  the  utility  is  public  or  private…  Compared  to  the  quality  of 
regulation, ownership seems relatively less important, though there may be more chance of 
high-quality regulation under private than public ownership”. Agreeing with the first part of 
this observation, I have my reservations with respect to the second part. The government often 
plays the role of an absentee landlord. A”high-quality” regulator can be more effective in this 
regime than when he has to face the united front of a private owner and the employee union. 
The  regulatory  regime  allowed  the  incumbent  to  phase  in  gradually  into  the  new 
competitive environment. When the domestic market finally opened to competition in 2005, ￿￿ 39
liberalization hardly affected prices. The European experience shows that liberalization often 
led  to  gains  in  welfare  of  the  business  sector  at  the  expense  of  the  residential  sector. 
Hopefully, the increased productivity of Bezeq and rebalancing should mitigate the blow to 
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Table 1. Access and Traffic - Bezeq 1984-1996 
         
  Phone lines  Minutes 
  Thousands  Index  Millions  Index 
         
1984/85  1103  100  5803  100 
1985/86  1208  110  6192  107 
1986/87  1313  119  6985  120 
         
1986   1283  116  6681  115 
1987   1392  126  8150  140 
1988   1472  133  8750  151 
1989   1534  139  9700  167 
1990   1626  147  10400  179 
1991   1704  154  11200  193 
1992   1804  164  12361  213 
1993   1958  178  14597  252 
1994   2138  194  16100  277 
1995   2343  212  18072  311 
1996   2539  230  18758  323 
         
Annual Growth rate (%)       
         
1984-1990    7.0%    10.7% 
1990-1996    7.7%    10.3% 
 
    Source: Bezeq Annual Statistic Reports 1987-1996 ￿￿ 43
 
Table 2. Bezeq Traffic 1995-2002 
                 
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
                  
Subscribers 
(thousands)  2,343  2,545  2,675  2,807  2,878  3,021  3,033  3,023 
                  
Traffic (mil. Minutes)                 
Local  14,225  14,705  13,347  13,462  13,259  13,020  12,170   
Intercity  3,847  4,054  5,441  5,488  5,405  5,307  4,961   
Total land to land 
(LTL)  18,072  18,759  18,788  18,950  18,664  18,327  17,131  16,107 
Internet  -  -  1,064  1,976  3,602  8,261  14,217  13,984 
Land to mobile (LTM )   628  1,314  1,839  2,163  2,656  3,341  3,692  3,555 
Mobile to land (MTL)  688  1,384  1,880  2,074  2,457  2,747  2,911  2,836 
International 
interconnect  669  778  876  1,090  1,287  1,393  1,489  1,541 
Total   20,057  22,235  24,447  26,253  28,666  34,069  39,440  38,023 
                 
Index (1998=100)                 
                  
Subscribers   83.5  90.7  95.3  100.0  102.5  107.6  108.0  107.7 
                  
Traffic                  
Local  105.7  109.2  99.1  100.0  98.5  96.7  90.4   
Intercity  70.1  73.9  99.1  100.0  98.5  96.7  90.4   
Total land to land 
(LTL)  95.4  99.0  99.1  100.0  98.5  96.7  90.4  85.0 
Internet  0.0  0.0  53.8  100.0  182.3  418.1  719.5  707.7 
Land to mobile (LTM )   29.0  60.7  85.0  100.0  122.8  154.5  170.7  164.4 
Mobile to land (MTL)  33.2  At  90.6  100.0  118.5  132.4  140.4  136.7 
International 
interconnect  61.4  71.4  80.4  100.0  118.1  127.8  136.6  141.4 
Total   76.4  84.7  93.1  100.0  109.2  129.8  150.2  144.8 
                  
Total output  82.4  90.1  94.4  100.0  104.6  114.3  120.7  118.3 
                 
Traffic composition 
(%)                 
                  
Local  70.9%  66.1%  54.6%  51.3%  46.3%  38.2%  30.9%   
Intercity  19.2%  18.2%  22.3%  20.9%  18.9%  15.6%  12.6%   
Total land to land 
(LTL)  90.1%  84.4%  76.9%  72.2%  65.1%  53.8%  43.4%  42.4% 
Internet  0.0%  0.0%  4.4%  7.5%  12.6%  24.2%  36.0%  36.8% 
Land to mobile (LTM )   3.1%  5.9%  7.5%  8.2%  9.3%  9.8%  9.4%  9.4% 
Mobile to land (MTL)  3.4%  6.2%  7.7%  7.9%  8.6%  8.1%  7.4%  7.5% 
International 
interconnect  3.3%  3.5%  3.6%  4.2%  4.5%  4.1%  3.8%  4.1% 
Total   100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
                 
Source: The Rates Review Committee 2002, Table 1.3 
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Table 3. the Fixed Lines and the Mobile Markets 1995-2001 
               
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Subscribers (thousands)                
Fixed line network         2,545        2,675        2,807        2,878        3,021        3,033  
Mobile network         1,162        1,700        2,290        2,855        4,260        5,511  
                 
Traffic (mil. minutes)                
Land to land (LTL)  18,072 
    
18,759  
    
18,788  
    
18,950  
    
18,664  
    
18,327  
    
17,319  
Land to mobile (LTM)          628        1,314        1,384        2,163        2,656        3,341        3,775  
Total fixed line origin 
    
18,700  
    
20,073  
    
20,172  
    
21,113  
    
21,320  
    
21,668  
    
21,094  
Mobile to land (MTL)          213        1,384        1,870        2,011        2,406        2,652        2,797  
Mobile to mobile (MTM)  56          676        1,161        1,798        2,928        4,917        7,352  
      Within networks             38           515           858        1,361        2,046        3,338        5,007  
      Between networks  19          160           302           437           882        1,579        2,345  
Total mobile origin          269        2,060        3,031        3,809        5,334        7,568  
    
10,149  
                
Total 
    
18,969  
    
22,133  
    
23,203  
    
24,922  
    
26,654  
    
29,236  
    
31,243  
 
Index (1998 = 100)                      
                 
Subscribers                 
Fixed line network    90.7  95.3  100.0  102.5  107.6  108.0 
Mobile network    50.7  74.2  100.0  124.7  186.0  240.7 
                 
Traffic                 
Land to land (LTL)  95.4  99.0  99.1  100.0  98.5  96.7  91.4 
Land to mobile (LTM)  29.0  60.7  64.0  100.0  122.8  154.5  174.5 
Total fixed line origin  88.6  95.1  95.5  100.0  101.0  102.6  99.9 
                 
Mobile to land (MTL)  10.6  68.8  93.0  100.0  119.6  131.8  139.0 
Mobile to mobile (MTM)  3.1  37.6  64.5  100.0  162.9  273.5  408.9 
      Within networks   2.8  37.9  63.1  100.0  150.4  245.3  368.0 
      Between networks  4.2  36.6  69.2  100.0  201.7  361.1  536.2 
Total mobile origin  7.1  54.1  79.6  100.0  140.0  198.7  266.4 
                 
Total  76.1  88.8  93.1  100.0  106.9  117.3  125.4 
Traffic composition (%)                      
Land to land (LTL)  95.3%  84.8%  81.0%  76.0%  70.0%  62.7%  55.4% 
Land to mobile (LTM)  3.3%  5.9%  6.0%  8.7%  10.0%  11.4%  12.1% 
Total fixed line origin  98.6%  90.7%  86.9%  84.7%  80.0%  74.1%  67.5% 
                 
Mobile to land (MTL)  1.1%  6.3%  8.1%  8.1%  9.0%  9.1%  9.0% 
Mobile to mobile (MTM)  0.3%  3.1%  5.0%  7.2%  11.0%  16.8%  23.5% 
      Within networks   0.2%  2.3%  3.7%  5.5%  7.7%  11.4%  16.0% 
      Between networks  0.1%  0.7%  1.3%  1.8%  3.3%  5.4%  7.5% 
Total mobile origin  1.4%  9.3%  13.1%  15.3%  20.0%  25.9%  32.5% 
                 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Source: The Rates Review Committee 2002, Table 1.2         ￿￿ 45
Table 4: The Ad-Hoc Review Committees Main Recommendations 
 
Committee   I   II   III   IV  
￿ ￿
Rate period   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   1994-1998  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   2003-2007 
Rate of return (%)   8.5  ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ .0  
Overall change in 
tariffs (%)  
+15.0  -10.0  -10.5  -5.5 
X-factor proposed(%)   3.0 -3.5  6.5  7.0  3.5 
X-factor approved (%)  3.0 -3.5   6.0 - 6.5 (3.5)  6.0 ( 3.5 )  2.5 
Change in   
fixed fee (%)  
--  --  +12.0  +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
Change in   
price of calls (%)  
--  --  -32.0  -23.4 
Interconnect rate-Peak  
( US cents)  
--  --  0.7 – 2.1  1.0  ￿￿ 46
 
                                                   Table 5:  Phone Rates Annual and CPI Change 
( Mean and Standard Deviation) 1973-2002 
     
       
  Phone Rates  CPI 
Number of 
Annual 
   Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Rate Changes 
1973-1977  -5.1%  8.0%  28.4%  6.2%  2.0 
1977-1985  -3.5%  12.8%  90.5%  38.8%  7.4 
1985-1991  0.2%  8.0%  20.7%  9.2%  2.0 
1991-2003  -5.6%  3.5%  6.7%  4.2%  1.3 
               
1973-2003  -3.9%  8.2%  34.5%  39.6%  3.1 ￿￿ 47
 
Table 6. Bezeq Cash Flow Report 1990- 2002 
(millions of $, XII.2002 prices) 
 
  1990-1996  1997 - 2002  1990 - 2002 
  Total  Average  Total  Average  Total  Average 
             
Sources:             
             
Net  Profit  768  110  -174  -29  594  46 
             
Losses of subsidiary companies  -128  -18  437  73  309  24 
Taxes  457  65  144  24  601  46 
Other (income) and expenses  263  38  685  114  948  73 
             
Operational profit (before taxes}  1361  194  1091  182  2452  189 
Depreciation  3222  460  2922  487  6144  473 
Cash flow from current operation  4583  655  4013  669  8596  661 
             
Uses             
             
Investment in fixed equipment  -3210  -459  -1414  -236  -4624  -356 
Worker compensation (early 
retirement)  -190  -27  -450  -75  -640  -49 
Investment in subsidiary companies  -15  -2  -270  -45  -285  -22 
Net debt repayment  -495  -71  -1512  -252  -2007  -154 
Other expenses  -62  -9  -36  -6  -97  -7 
Tax payments  -508  -73  -212  -35  -720  -55 
Dividends  -104  -15  -120  -20  -224  -17 
             
Total uses  -4583  -655  -4013  -669  -8596  -661 
 




Table 7. The Welfare Effect of a Proportionate Markup vs. Ramsey Pricing - A Simulation 
(The price elasticity of access = 0.1,price elasticity of traffic = 0.5) 
                   
   Proportionate markup  Ramsey pricing   Committee proposal 
   Access  Traffic  Total  Access  Traffic  Total  Access  Traffic  Total 
                             
1998 Actual                        
Output   2,800  31,400     2,800  31,400     2,800  31,400    
Revenue (mil. $)   353  720  1,072  353  720  1,072  353  720  1,072 
Direct cost (mil. $)  380  169  549  380  169  549  380  169  549 
Common costs 
(mil. $)       296      296       296 
                         
Average rate    126  2.29     126  2.29     126  2.29    
Average direct cost   136  0.54     136  0.54     136  0.54    
Markup (%)  -7.8 %  76.5 %    -7.8 %  76.5 %    -7.8 %  76.5 %   
                         
Proposal                        
Markup (%)  31.2 %  31.2 %  31.2%  42.6 %  8.5 %     0.0 %  56.1 %    
Average rate  197  0.78     236  0.59     136  1.23    
                         
Output  2,677  53,783     2,629  62,007     2,779  42,935    
Revenue (mil. $)   528  420  948  621  365  986  377  526  904 
Direct cost (mil. $)   363  289  653  357  333  690  377  231  608 
Common costs 
(mil. $)   165  131  296  265  31  296  0  296  296 
                         
Change                        
Average rate(%)  56.6%  -65.9%     87.7%  -74.4%     7.8%  -46.5%    
Revenue (mil. $)   175  -300  -124  269  -355  -87  25  -193  -169 
Consumer surplus 
(mil. $)   -195  599  404  -299  711  412  -27  387  359 
Comments:                   
1. Access is measured in thousands of subscribers and traffic is measured in millions of minutes. The access 
average rate is the annual fixed fee measured in dollars (and so are the average direct costs of access). 
Traffic is measured in million of minutes and the average rate of traffic is the rate per minute measured in 
cents. 

















Figure 1. International Traffic 1993 – 2001 
Source: The Rates Review Committee 2002, p.4 
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Figure 6. Bezeq D-O Profitability  1994-2002 (Mill $) 
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